An iterative technique to identify browser fingerprinting scripts by Durey, Antonin et al.
An iterative technique to identify browser fingerprinting scripts






Abstract—Browser fingerprinting is a stateless
identification technique based on browser properties.
Together, they form an identifier that can be col-
lected without users’ notice and has been studied to
be unique and stable. As this technique relies on
browser properties that serve legitimate purposes, the
detection of this technique is challenging. While sev-
eral studies propose classification techniques, none of
these are publicly available, making them difficult to
reproduce. This paper proposes a new browser finger-
printing detection technique. Based on an incremen-
tal process, it relies on both automatic and manual
decisions to be both reliable and fast. The automatic
step matches API calls similarities between scripts
while the manual step is required to classify a script
with different calls. We publicly share our algorithm
and implementation to improve the general knowl-




As cookies and stateful identification techniques be-
come more and more restricted in browsers [8, 18],
new techniques have emerged to identify users across
the web. Among them, browser fingerprinting is
an identification technique based on the collection
of browser properties. It is permissionless, uno-
ticeable for the users and has been studied to be
unique [7, 13, 10] and stable [17]. While identifying
cookie uses by scripts is easy, browser fingerprinting
relies on dozens of JavaScript APIs that have legit-
imate usages when used separately. Therefore, the
identification of this technique is difficult.
We propose here a incremental technique to iden-
tify browser fingerprinting by classifying an input
dataset made of scripts. We defined 3 labels to be
assigned to scripts: fingerprinter—or suspect—for
scripts that we consider doing fingerprinting, non-
fingerprinter—or clean—for scripts not collecting a
fingerprint, and unknown for scripts we do not have
enough information about to make a decision. We
used the browser fingerprinting scripts identified by
Disconnect to provide a ground truth and initi-
ate our algorithm with a list of fingerprinters [6].
We then computed a similarity score between scripts
from the input dataset and fingerprinters based on
API calls that are known to be used for finger-
printing. Using the similarity score, we could auto-
matically classify the script as fingerprinter or non-
fingerprinter. If the automatic algorithm could not
be able to label a script, we propose a manual phase
to label the script. At the end of the execution, each
script of the input dataset is labeled fingerprinter,
non-fingerprinter or unknown.
The rest of this report is organized as follow. We
present the state of the art in Section 2. We describe
our technique in Section 3. We discuss our technique























2 Background & related work
2.1 Browser fingerprinting
Browser fingerprinting is a technique to identify
a user based on its hardware characteristics and
browser configurations. It combines properties to
build an identifier [12] such as the HTTP headers [7],
navigator and screen JavaScript properties [7, 13],
canvas [14] and WebGL rendering [4]. Studied by
Eckersley [7] and Laperdrix et al. [13], the technique
can lead to a unique identifier. Moreover, Vastel et
al. [16] showed it is possible to rely on some stable
properties to obtain a stable fingerprint and track
users accross the web for a long period of time. The
identification property of a fingerprint can lead ei-
ther to a tracking technique for malicious purposes [9]
or to enhance web security by improving authentica-
tion [2] or detecting bots [17].
2.2 Classification of fingerprinters
Since its inception in 2010, browser fingerprint-
ing also triggered many research contributions to
identify the characteristics of scripts implementing
browser fingerprinting techniques. These contribu-
tions mostly lead to the publication of lists of URLs
or common patterns. For example, several browsers
or extensions use Disconnect1 or Easy Privacy2 to
protect users against fingerprinters. Some studies
focused on classifying browser fingerprinting scripts
(or fingerprinters) [1, 9]. Unfortunately, these stud-
ies only focus on a reduced set of attributes and
are not relevant when studying a real-world dataset
adopting advanced browser fingerprinting techniques.
Bird et al. [3] used API call similarities to detect
fingerprinters and train a machine learning model.
However, their ground truth consists of specific at-
tributes or keyword lists that cannot be considered
reliable when labeling a real-world dataset. More
recently, Iqbal et al. [11] and Rizzo et al. [15] pro-





ing scripts. Both studies combined static and dy-
namic analysis to build a machine learning classifier.
They both relied on a manual analysis to improve
the classifier over time. Another more recent work
aims at building signatures based on the script’s be-
haviour [5]. While we believe their approach is the
most advanced one to distinguish malicious from be-
nign scripts, it has not been used to classify browser
fingerprinting scripts. moreover, the code of all of
these approaches is not publicly available, making
them difficult to reproduce and reuse.
3 Classification of Fingerprint-
ers: an incremental method
The efficiency of browser fingerprinting relies on the
design and implementation of a wide combination
of stateless attributes, which can uniquely identify
a user that visits a web page. However, this com-
bination of fingerprinting attributes is not formally
defined and constantly changes due to the evolu-
tion of JavaScript APIs. The list of attributes we
collected covers all the attributes currently reported
in the literature, but this list might evolve as some
API might become deprecated or being removed by
browsers vendors. Oppositely, new APIs introduced
in browsers might be reported by the community as
being usable in a fingerprinting context. This makes
browser fingerprinting challenging to detect at large.
As we mentioned in Section 2, some techniques ex-
ist [11, 15] to classify fingerprinting scripts, but their
implementation is not publicly available, leading to
a technique hardly reusable to label a real-world
dataset using all the attributes a browser fingerprint
contains. This section, therefore, applies a supervised
classification technique that leverages a ground truth
of known browser fingerprinting scripts to label a col-
lection of unknown scripts as fingerprinter or non-
fingerprinter, based on the combination of APIs and
parameters they access. We use similar techniques
and methodology reported in the litterature [11, 15],
provide our classification algorithm in Appendix A
2
and the implementation online.3
Given the lack of a formal model to identify
browser fingerprinting scripts, we propose to adopt
an incremental classification process. In particular,
we leverage a list of scripts classified as fingerprinter
by Disconnect to explore similarities in the ac-
cessed APIs. Therefore, we compute the similar-
ity score (Jaccard index) to automatically classify
our scripts. If a script cannot be labeled automat-
ically, we go through a manual analysis to classify it.
We continuously update the similarity scores when-
ever a script is classified as fingerprinter or non-
fingerprinter. This way, we reduce the number of
iterations required to label all the scripts included
in our dataset by exploiting script similarities. Fig-
ure 1 provides an overview of our incremental script
classification approach.
3.1 Learning fingerprinting attributes
from Disconnect
We bootstrap our approach with the Disconnect
project that provides a list of fingerprinters whose
behavior has been analyzed by experts [6]. Discon-
nect has the advantage of being public, constantly
updated, and recognized by the community to be re-
liable [3, 11, 15].
Our first step consists of extracting all the
JavaScript attributes attr(fi) accessed by each of
the fingerprinters fi ∈ F reported by Disconnect
to identify the discriminating features of known fin-
gerprinters. We bypass minification and obfuscation
techniques by instrumenting and monitoring the run-
time behavior of each script loaded in an empty web
page. Each signature of a fingerprinting attribute is
structured as a 3-tuple 〈name, args,N〉, where name
is the name of the accessed API, args is he list of
parameters used to retrieve this attribute (empty if
none) and N is the number of times that the pair
〈name, args〉 has been observed along with the ex-
ecution of script fi. This results in a matrix of at-




3.2 Computing the fingerprinter sim-
ilarity for unknown scripts
We start an incremental classification process that
takes as input the classification matrix of known fin-
gerprinters (MF ) and the list of scripts (S) from our
dataset of secure web pages. For each script si ∈ S:
1. we extract the set of attributes for each script
(attr(si)),
2. we compute the similarity score (Jaccard index)
between attr(si) and the attributes attr(fj) of
each known fingerprinter fj ∈ F , and
3. we keep the tuple with the maximum similarity
score and its corresponding intersection
〈 si , jaccard(attr(si), attr(fj)) ,
attr(si)∩attr(fj)) 〉.
We order the scripts from S by decreasing similarity
score to iteratively find the closest known fingerprint-
ers to this script.
3.3 Auto-labelling
If the maximum similarity score of si equals 1,
si implements a browser fingerprinting feature and
we automatically label it as such. However, if
the score is less than 1, we need to compare to
all of the non-fingerprinting scripts already labeled
to take a decision. For each non-fingerprinter
ck ∈ C, we calculate a new intersection (that
reuses the previous one we saved), specifically
attr(ck) ∩ (attr(si)∩attr(fj)), and we keep the re-
sult that maximizes the size of the new intersection.
If the attributes we obtain from our intersection with
fingerprinters are the same attributes we obtain from
our intersection with non-fingerprinters, i.e., the in-
tersections are equal, the script’s fingerprinting at-
tributes are not discriminating enough to be con-
sidered a fingerprinter, so we label the script si as
a non-fingerprinter script. However, if the intersec-
tions differ, the fingerprinting attributes attr(si) are
new in the classification, and our algorithm cannot






















































b) Script APIs extraction and similarity computing
c) Auto-labelling





Figure 1: Flow chart representing our incremental script classification algorithm.
3.4 Manual labeling
As pointed out by previous studies [3, 11, 15], manual
labeling is necessary when the automatic tools used
to classify are unable to decide the label of a script. If
our algorithm cannot automatically label the script,
we manually analyze the code and label it as either
fingerprinter, non-fingerprinter, or unknown. To do
so, we use the following criteria:
• the script is blocked by EasyList or EasyPri-
vacy,4
• the script contains obvious keywords that reveal
its goal (e.g., fingerprinting, deviceFingerprint),
• the attribute values are forwarded to a remote
server, as it can be used to compute similarities
with previously saved fingerprints, or
• the privacy policy, when available, of the com-
pany owning the script mentions fingerprint-
ing, stateless identification technique, device or
browser identification.
As soon as the manual evaluation matches 2 of the
above criteria, we label the script as fingerprinter.
Whenever we label a fingerprinter, the fingerprint-
4https://github.com/easylist/easylist
ing attributes of si are added to the detection matrix
MF . Each time we rerun the classification process in
a new iteration and stop when all the scripts of our
dataset have been labeled. The classification algo-
rithm can be found in appendix A.
4 Threat to validity
Script classification only relies on what is observed
on a client-side. The backend treatment applied to
the collected data cannot be analyzed. Thus, it is
impossible to understand with certitude the usage of
the browser fingerprinting technique. While classifi-
cation techniques tend to estimate a script goal, they
suffer several threats:
Attributes. It is not possible to monitor accesses
to HTTP headers as they are systematically sent
with every request, whether or not the website uses
them. They can be used by themselves or in ag-
gregation with other fingerprinting techniques. Even
if the HTTP headers alone cannot uniquely identify
users [10], they can still be used to add entropy.
The ground truth. Our classification algo-
4
rithm leverages the distances computed between our
dataset and the ground truth we chose. While Dis-
connect is considered as reliable by the littera-
ture [11, 3, 15], we cannot guarantee the results given
by our algorithm would have been the same if we de-
cided to use a different ground truth.
Manual labelling. Concerning manual labeling,
other experts in the domain could have different opin-
ions about some scripts, leading to different labels
in ambiguous cases. For example, the collection of
navigator and screen properties can help a web-
site adapts itself to the device and browser of a user.
Some users could consider this as fingerprinting while
other could estimate this data collection legitimate
for the website. Thus, we expect several users of
our technique to obtain different results according to
their conception of browser fingerprinting.
Similar scripts. Our algorithm labels scripts based
on the similarity between the attributes collected by
a script. Because we based our approach on finger-
printing attributes, we assumed 2 scripts collecting
the same attributes should have the same label. This
restriction might have only minor consequences for
scripts that collect dozens of attributes and show lit-
tle ambiguity, however, scripts with a limited number
of attributes might use the same attributes for differ-
ent purposes.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a new methodology to
classify browser fingerprinting script. Based on an
iterative approach, the technique uses the advantage
of both automatic and manual labelling to label a
dataset of scripts. This technique can be used to
classify a wild dataset from scripts obtained of real
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Algorithm 1 Script classification algorithm






7: while !hasEnded do
8: needToRecompute← False
9: scriptsScoreAndIntersection← ComputeScoreAndIntersection(fingerprinters, dataset)
10: SortByScoreDesc(scriptsScoreAndIntersection)
11: i← 0
12: while !needToRecomputeAndi < Length(scriptsScoreAndIntersection) do
13: script, score, fingerprintersIntersection← scriptsScoreAndIntersection[i]
14: if score = 1 then
15: suspectScripts← suspectScripts ∪ 〈script〉
16: else
17: cleanIntersection← ComputeBiggestIntersection(cleanScripts, intersection)
18: if Equals(fingerprintersIntersection, cleanIntersection) then
19: cleanScripts← cleanScripts ∪ 〈script〉
20: else
21: label←ManuallyLabelScript(script)
22: if IsFP(label) then
23: fingerprinters← fingerprinters ∪ 〈script〉
24: needToRecompute← True
25: else if IsNonFP(label) then
26: cleanScripts← cleanScripts ∪ 〈script〉
27: needToRecompute← True
28: else if IsUnknown(label) then




33: i← i + 1
34: end while




39: return suspectScripts, cleanScripts, unknownScripts
40: end function
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